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This article argues that, under certain conditions, allowing insurgents into the
political process – through elections or government posts – can be a useful
tool in the peace process and can help end insurgencies. However, bringing
insurgents into the political process is unlikely to end insurgencies on its own,
particularly if insurgents, the government, or the population believes that
force is still a viable means of defeating the opponent and changing the status
quo. The article begins with a brief overview of the causes of insurgency and
on conflict resolution for internal wars. The article then considers two
examples of insurgents that have entered the political process – the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland and Hezbollah in Lebanon – and
the differing degrees of success in transforming these insurgents to non-
violent participants in the political process. It concludes by suggesting how
insurgents can be brought into the political process as part of conflict
resolution and the implications for Afghanistan.
Keywords: insurgency; counterinsurgency; conflict resolution; negotiations;
IRA; Hezbollah; Iraq; Afghanistan
During an October 2006 trip to Afghanistan, then US Senate Majority Leader Bill
Frist proposed bringing the Taliban into the political process in order to end the
growing insurgency against the Afghan government and NATO forces.1 The
controversial comment came nearly five years after the commencement of US-led
military action aimed at deposing the Taliban from political power in
Afghanistan. Again, in 2010, General Petraeus, as commander of the war in
Afghanistan, argued that a necessary step for ending the country’s insurgency
was to bring the Taliban into negotiations with the Afghan government and create
conditions for their renunciation of violence and return to society.2 These
discussions over what to do about persisting political violence in Afghanistan
suggest a wider question about how governments can end insurgencies.
Specifically: should insurgents be brought into the political process and, if so,
under what conditions?
ISSN 0959-2318 print/ISSN 1743-9558 online




Small Wars & Insurgencies
Vol. 22, No. 4, October 2011, 644–668
This article argues that, under certain conditions, allowing insurgents into the
political process can be a viable strategy for ending insurgencies. Including
insurgents in the government offers several benefits for ending internal wars: it
gives those fighting the government an alternative means for changing the
political status quo and offers them stakes in the political future of their country.
Bringing insurgents into the political process also holds these groups accountable
to their rhetoric and promises; if they do not deliver, they will most likely lose
their constituents and positions of power. Furthermore, including insurgents in
the political process draws otherwise clandestine groups out into the open and
holds them accountable to a government’s rules and laws. Finally, including
insurgents in the government may reduce the need for long-term third party
guarantors. However, bringing insurgents into the political process alone is
unlikely to end insurgencies, particularly if insurgents, the government, or the
population believes that force is still a viable means of defeating the opponent
and changing the status quo.
The article begins by examining two sets of literature: research on the causes
of insurgencies and literature on conflict resolution. It then considers two cases of
insurgents that have entered the political process with differing degrees of
success in ending violence: the IRA in Northern Ireland, an insurgency that has
largely come to an end, and the Lebanese Hezbollah, which still maintains an
active armed struggle against the state of Israel. The article concludes by
outlining the conditions under which bringing insurgents into the political
process helps end violence against the state in general, and implications for the
pursuit of peace and state-building in Afghanistan.
What causes insurgencies? How do they end?
In the years following the US-led invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq, policy and
academic circles have focused on better understanding insurgent violence.
Insurgency is not, however, a new phenomenon, and a useful body of literature
exists on both its causes and strategies for its possible cure. This section begins by
outlining the causes of insurgencies, emphasizing three points: that insurgency is
violence aimed at changing the political status quo; that winning over populations,
not eradicating insurgents, is the key to winning insurgencies; and that counter-
insurgencies require amix ofmilitary and non-military action. It then builds on this
discussion by outlining arguments on civil conflict resolution, challenging three
assumptions in the literature: the emphasis on sequential stages to resolution,
including the need for disarmament early in the process; the necessity of inter-
national third party guarantors for conflict resolution; and the problem of ‘total
spoilers’.
Literature on the causes of insurgency stresses that insurgency is politically
motivated and violence is a means to political ends. For example, French scholar
David Galula defines an insurgency as ‘a protracted struggle conducted methodi-
cally, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives, leading
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finally to the overthrow of the existing order’.3 Bard O’Neill’s definition
proposes: ‘Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a non-ruling group
and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political
resources (e.g. organization expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and
violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more
aspects of politics.’4 In Why Men Rebel, Ted Robert Gurr’s argument for
insurgency focuses on the role of what he calls ‘politicized discontent’ as a
necessary condition for insurgency. Gurr asserts that discontent alone does not
lead to violence but rather ‘politicized discontent is a necessary condition for the
resort to violence in politics’; in other words, the state is blamed as the source of
discontent and therefore becomes the target of violence.5
Similarly, the 2006 US Army Counterinsurgency Manual defines an
insurgency as an ‘organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted
government through the use of subversion and armed conflict’.6 ‘Political power,’
it further argues, ‘is the central issue in an insurgency.’7 Insurgency, therefore, to
adjust Clausewitz’s maxim, is politics by other means.
Scholars of insurgency further assert that populations play a pivotal role in the
conflict and that they are, in fact, the ‘center of gravity’, meaning that whichever
side secures the loyalty of the population wins the conflict.8 Galula’s argument
for what makes a successful insurgency hinges on the passive and active support
of the population. He asserts:
If the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent [the
government], to control it physically, to get its active support, he will win the war
because, in the final analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or
explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness.9
In order to win the population to its side, leaders of the insurgency require an
‘attractive cause’ that will draw in the largest number of supporters, keep them
engaged in the conflict, and compel them to make sacrifices and suffer.10 Often-
times, states become the cause de guerre and insurgents exploit popular grievances
against the state. This puts the state at a disadvantage in the battle to win over
the population. Robert Taber asserts: ‘The population . . . is the key to the entire
struggle. Indeed, although Western analysts seem to dislike entertaining this idea,
it is the population which is doing the struggling.’11 O’Neill divides popular
support between passive members of society and active, intellectual participants,
stressing the unique and important role each plays in supporting an insurgency.12
Counterinsurgency literature asserts that a successful counterinsurgency
strategy cannot rely on military action alone. Galula argues that successful
counterinsurgency strategies require marrying military and non-military action in
order to create a holistic plan:
It is not enough for the government to set political goals, to determine how much
military force is applicable, to enter into alliances or to break them; politics becomes
an active instrument of operation. And so intricate is the interplay between the
political and the military actions that they cannot be tidily separated; on the
646 H.S. Gregg
contrary, every military move has to be weighed with regard to political effects, and
vice versa.13
He contrasts this to the insurgent’s position:
The insurgent, whose political establishment is a party and whose armed forces are
the party’s forces, enjoys an obvious advantage over his opponent, whose political
establishment man not be supported by a party or by a coalition of parties with their
centrifugal tendencies, and whose army is the nation’s army, reflecting the
consensus or the lack of consensus in the nation.14
Galula acknowledges that the counterinsurgent has a preponderance of material
resources, including military and economic assets, but that they have a tougher
job of winning the people over than the insurgents because insurgents have
the cause on their side; it is therefore crucial that the counterinsurgents’ actions
not help fuel the cause.15 Military action alone can do precisely that by validating
insurgent’s claims that the government is unjust and against the people.
The US Army Field Manual echoes these points, defining successful
counterinsurgency (COIN) as ‘military, paramilitary, political, economic, psycho-
logical, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency’.16 The
Manual further stresses: ‘Political and military leaders and planners should never
underestimate [COIN’s] scale and complexity; moreover, they should recognized
that the Armed Forces cannot succeed in COIN alone.’17
Insurgencies, therefore, are inherently political, and violence is the means
through which insurgents aim to change the political status quo. Populations are
the battlefield over which insurgencies are won and lost, and the side that wins the
support of the people wins the war. Finally, if popularly backed, military means
alone cannot win an insurgency; a successful counterinsurgency is not marked by
the defeat of the insurgents but, rather, is marked by the cessation of violence
against the state.
Separate from the literature on causes of insurgency, but useful for considering
how insurgencies end, is an extensive body of research on conflict resolution for
internal wars. Three norms in the literature are of particular importance for
political solutions to insurgencies: the emphasis on the need for disarmament early
in the process; the necessity of international third party guarantors for conflict
resolution; and the problem of ‘spoilers’, or insurgents that disrupt the peace
process.
In theory and in practice, conflict resolution emphasizes the need for
disarmament as a necessary step early on in the peace process. For example, the
United Nations has stressed the need for disarmament in numerous Security
Council Resolutions, including for Lebanon, Palestine, and Sudan, to name a
few.18 Similarly, Kumar and de Zeeuw argue that disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration (DDR) is the first step in conflict resolution, and that this
necessary condition paves the way for economic transition (including macro-
economic reforms, property rights, and the promotion of the private sector); and
political transformation, specifically the creation of a democratic government.19
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The norm towards disarming early does not consider that, under certain conditions,
weapons can serve as a defensive guarantee, and that disarmamentmay actually be
militarily destabilizing and a stumbling block for conflict resolution.
Conflict resolution scholarship also tends to emphasize the importance of a
third party – such as another state or an international organization – to act as a
guarantor in the process and its implementation. Water’s argument, for example,
hinges on this very point. She contends that the peace process breaks down not in
negotiations or a settlement but in its implementation, and that successful
implementations require a third party to act as a guarantor during this vulnerable
stage of transition.20 Aggestam draws on Zartman and others to stress that power
asymmetries in negotiations – which are typical in insurgencies – can cause talks
to break down and that third parties can balance out asymmetries in negotiations.21
The contributors to From Soldiers to Politicians also focus on the role of
international actors in civil conflicts, stressing outside actors’ importance both as
contributors to conflict – through diasporic communities, funding, and cross-
border meddling – and as factors that can contribute positively to the peace
process.22 Stephen Stedman, in his influential article onmanaging spoilers in peace
processes, also stresses the importance of a third party – what he calls ‘custodians’
– in resolving internal conflicts. He states: ‘Where international custodians have
created and implemented coherent, effective strategies for protecting peace and
managing spoilers, damage has been limited and peace has triumphed.’23 The
norm of including a third party to police the peace process does not adequately
consider alternative means of ensuring lasting stability, particularly domestic
arrangements.
Finally, several scholars note the problem of ‘spoilers’ in resolving internal
conflicts. Stedman defines spoilers as ‘leaders and parties who believe that peace
emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and
use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it’.24 Newman and Richmond
expand on this definition to include individuals and parties that use non-violent
tactics, including the process itself, to derail a lasting peace.25 Stedman describes
three different types of spoilers, ‘limited, greedy, and total’, noting that each
requires different tactics to manage during the peace process: limited spoilers
have negotiable goals, greedy spoilers’ goals change depending on opportunity,
and the goals of total spoilers are non-negotiable.26 Stedman is quick to note,
however, that spoilers can migrate from one category to another depending, in
part, on how the peace process is realized.27 Spoilers, regardless of their type,
appear to be a perennial problem in conflict resolution; successful processes
require strategies for minimizing their ability to derail the peace.
Combining the literature on causes of insurgency with the literature on
conflict resolution yields important strategies for ending insurgencies. First, if
insurgencies are politically motivated violence, then engaging insurgents in the
political process may help end insurgencies. More recent scholarship explores the
possibility of bringing insurgents into the political process by transforming these
movements into political parties. From Soldiers to Politicians describes several
648 H.S. Gregg
civil wars that have created lasting peace by transforming insurgents into
politicians, including El Salvador, Mozambique, East Timor, and Liberia.28
However, the book focuses specifically on the period after the war.29 The
following discussion will argue that bringing insurgents into the political process
could, under certain circumstances, actually be part of the peace process.
Including popularly backed insurgents in the political process early on may
be a useful means for transforming violent opposition to the government into a
constructive voice for change. Including insurgents in the government offers
those fighting the government an alternative means for changing the political
status quo and gives them stakes in the political future of their country. Moreover,
including insurgents in the political process through elections holds these groups
accountable to their rhetoric and promises; if they do not deliver, they will most
likely lose their constituents and their positions of power. Including insurgents in
the political process also brings these otherwise clandestine groups out into the
open and holds them accountable to a state’s laws and rules.
Moreover, bringing insurgents into the political process may be a viable
substitute when third party guarantors are neither available nor willing to oversee
the peace process over the long haul. One possible solution to the absence of a
guarantor is to create incentives for insurgents, through political arrangements,
that hold them accountable to their constituents and that remove them from
power once they are not longer popularly backed or if they break the country’s
laws. A democratic government, in theory, offers such a solution.
Spoilers may also be managed by bringing insurgents into the political
process early on. Including insurgents in the political process may flesh out which
spoilers are open to compromise and which are not. The ones that play by the
rules can be accommodated, and the ones that do not can be dealt with by other
means.
As the cases will show, bringing insurgents into the political process alone is
unlikely to end the violence. Rather, there are certain conditions that make this a
successful strategy for ending politically motivated conflict.
From bombs to the ballot box: the IRA in Northern Ireland
The current insurgent threats facing the US military in Afghanistan are not new;
insurgencies also challenged the US and its allies during the Cold War, and these
conflicts hold useful lessons for insurgents’ motives and possible counter-
insurgency strategies. This section traces the insurgency in Northern Ireland,
arguably the longest conflict of the twentieth century, and its move away from
armed struggle to political engagement as a means of changing the status quo,
including the process of bringing members of the IRA into the government.
The origins of tensions between Catholics and Protestants in Ireland can be
traced back to the efforts of Britain’s King James I to create a loyal base in
Ireland by settling Protestant Scots and English through land grants in the
seventeenth century.30 These plantations, concentrated in the six Ulster counties
Small Wars & Insurgencies 649
in the North, deposed the preexisting Catholic population there and sparked
rebellions that eventually prompted King William of Orange to install a
Protestant ruler on the island in 1690.31 Catholics challenged British rule of
Ireland in the beginning of the 1900s under the Home Rule Movement. Following
a failed revolt in 1916, Catholic insurgents regrouped and succeeded in
negotiating independence for most of the island in 1920; the six northern
counties, however, remained under British authority.
In 1968, Catholics in Northern Ireland, inspired by the US civil rights
movement, began their own initiative aimed at gaining better rights within the
existing political system. Initially, protests were non-violent but, under the threat
of growing violence, Britain dispatched troops to Northern Ireland in 1969 to
keep the peace.32 Disagreements broke out within Catholic circles over what
actions to take against British policies, leading to a split within the IRA between
the ‘officials’, who called for a Marxist-socialist based, non-violent campaign,
and the ‘provisionals’, who advocated armed struggle.33 In 1971, the police and
military interned hundreds of Catholics, fueling discontent in the general
population and increasing momentum for the Provisional IRA.34
In 1972, a demonstration resulted in the death of 14 Catholic protesters in what
became known as ‘Bloody Sunday’. Amid increasing violence, the British
dissolved the North Irish parliament and began direct rule fromWestminster. This
led to both Protestant and Catholics bolstering militias and political parties, the
former to defend the status quo and the latter to fight for the end of British military
occupation and rule. The Protestants or ‘Unionist’ organized the moderate Ulster
Unionist Party, and the hard-line Democratic Unionist Party. TheUnionist militias
included theUlster DefenceAssociation and theUlster Volunteer Force. Catholics
or ‘Republicans’ organized around two main political parties, the moderate Social
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), and the more hard-line Sinn Fe´in, whose
militant arm was the IRA.35
For nearly 30 years, Unionist militias (also known as Loyalists), British
forces, and the IRA engaged in an armed struggle, neither side managing to
achieve their military goals of defeating the other. In 1975, the IRA agreed to a
ceasefire, believing that the British were preparing to withdraw their forces.
However, sectors of the population did not support the ceasefire and took up the
armed struggle outside the organized insurgency, leading to 216 civilian deaths.36
In 1976, the IRA reorganized its ranks, utilizing a cell-structure that allowed for
tighter control of its cadre and its use of violence.37
Political scientist Louise Richardson argues that, by the late 1970s, a military
stalemate had settled over the conflict, all factions realizing that force alone
would not change the status quo and, for the IRA, that the British would not be
compelled into retreat. The IRA did not abandon force at this point but began to
employ a mixture of political and military tactics aimed at changing the status
quo.38
The IRA undertook several non-violent initiatives in the 1980s that gave the
organization further influence and increased its backing from the local population.
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In 1980, IRAprisoners began a hunger strikewith the aimof compelling theBritish
government to recognize IRA detainees as prisoners of war instead of ‘special
category prisoners’, a title that did not recognize the political nature of their
actions.39 One of the strikers, Bobby Sands, ran for elections from prison, winning
on 9 April 1981. He then died three weeks later, becoming the first of ten hunger
strikers to die in protest. The campaign succeeded in boosting the IRA’s image
domestically and internationally, and demonstrated that the militants were willing
to suffer and die non-violently to change the political status quo. The hunger strikes
and elections also showed the insurgency that means other than violence could be
used to achieve their political goals. This realization prompted one leader in the
movement to call for Republicans to fight with ‘an Armalite in one hand and a
ballot box in the other’.40
In 1983, Gerry Adams became the leader of Sinn Fe´in, the political arm of the
IRA. Despite the political success of the hunger strikes and running in elections
for the Republican movement, Sinn Fe´in and the IRA did not abandon the use of
force at this time, but continued with bombing campaigns both in Britain and
Northern Ireland. Britain also continued on a parallel track of politics and force,
signing the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, which granted the Republic of
Ireland a consultative role on behalf of Catholics in the North.41 In 1987, an
attack during a Remembrance Sunday event at Enniskillen killed 11 citizens, one
of the most deadly attacks in years. Amid public outcry and international
condemnation, Adams criticized the attack and claimed that it undermined the
‘legitimate use of force’.42
In 1988, secret talks began between the two main Catholic political factions
in the North, the SDLP, headed by David Hume, and Gerry Adams’s Sinn Fe´in.
Although the talks did not yield immediate results, they marked an important
process that moved the rival Republican factions towards a unified front. Sinn
Fe´in took another step towards the use of politics over force in 1989, when Adams
called for a non-armed political movement to work towards self-determination.
The following year, the Northern Ireland secretary Peter Brooke stated that the
IRA could not be defeated militarily and that talks could help promote an end to
violence.43
Talks between the British and Republicans began as early as 1972, but did not
make significant progress until the 1990s.44 It was later revealed that secret
negotiations began between the British government and Sinn Fe´in as early as
1990.45 In 1991, official ‘round table’ talks began between the government and
militants, but Sinn Fe´in was excluded. In a 1993 joint statement, John Hume and
Gerry Adams revealed their secret talks. That same year, in November, secret
talks between London and the IRA were made public. Two weeks later, British
Prime Minister John Major and Irish Prime Minister Albert Reynolds created the
Downing Street Declaration, which accepted the right of Northern Ireland to self-
determination, if that were the will of the people.46
One month following the Downing Street Declaration, US President Bill
Clinton granted Gerry Adams a visa to visit the United States, despite pressure
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from the British government not to admit Adams. The trip gave Adams and Sinn
Fe´in an enormous publicity boost, allowing the leader and his movement to
circumvent the British media ban on mentioning the organization.47 Later that
year, on 31 August, the IRA announced a complete cessation of military
activities. The British government followed suit by lifting the media ban on the
IRA and, in October, the Combined Loyalist Military Command announced a
ceasefire.48
These announcements set the stage for negotiations towards a peace deal. The
process, however, was not without its setbacks. The IRA resumed military
operations in 1996 in response to what it believed to be stonewalling from
London and the Unionists, bombing sites in London and Manchester.49 Tensions
also mounted around the annual Orange Order parades – Unionist celebrations of
William of Orange’s victory over James II and the installation of Protestant rule
in Ireland – which were a chronic flashpoint of violence between Catholics and
Protestants in the North.
The primary sticking point in negotiations, however, became the
decommissioning of the IRA’s weapons. Initially, London and the Unionists
called for the IRA to relinquish its weapons first, followed by talks and the creation
of a representative government in Northern Ireland. The IRA, however, was
unwilling tomake itself militarily vulnerable at the outset of the process. In 1996, a
US delegation led by Senator George Mitchell proposed decommissioning
weapons amid peace talks, allowing the process to resume. In 1997, the IRA
announced the resumption of a ceasefire – a prerequisite to joining talks – and
Sinn Fe´in declared that it was going to pursue political change through
‘exclusively peacefulmeans’; their inclusion, however, prompted several Unionist
parties to boycott talks.50 Despite Unionist boycotts, Tony Blair met with Gerry
Adams two months after the ceasefire and, in January 1998, Blair announced a
formal inquiry into the ‘Bloody Sunday’ deaths as a goodwill gesture.51
In April 1998, Britain, Ireland, and major factions in Northern Ireland signed
a program for devolving British power and creating an independent assembly in
Northern Ireland, which became known as the ‘Good Friday Accords’. A public
referendum on the Accords was held in May, with the overwhelming majority of
the population voting in favor of the terms.52 Following the signing of the
Accords, a tiny faction emerged calling itself the ‘Real IRA’, which claimed
responsibility for a bombing in Omagh that killed 29 people. Rather than
sparking an outbreak of violence, the bombing unified the public against violence
and gave new impetus to the peace process.53 Although the Good Friday Accords
have not unfolded according to the original timeframe and there have been
several setbacks, especially around disarmament, the political process has slowly
moved forward. In 1999, the Belfast government devolved from Britain and the
Republic of Ireland renounced its claims to the North. The new government
included Unionist David Trimble as the first minister, Republican SDLP Seamus
Mallon as his deputy, and Sinn Fe´in member Martin McGuinness as the minister
of education.54
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The Irish conflict suggests several conditions under which insurgents can be
brought into the political process as a means of ending insurgency. The first, and
perhaps most important, necessary condition that allowed for insurgents in
Ireland to enter the political process was that the British government and the core
insurgents recognized that the conflict could not be resolved through military
means alone. The recognition of a military stalemate opened the door for new
avenues of changing the status quo through non-violent means. A military
stalemate in Northern Ireland occurred after several waves of violence – and
failed ceasefires – in which neither side could defeat the other; only then did
negotiations and non-violent means of resolution begin to take hold.
Moreover, a military stalemate was evident not only to the insurgents and
government, but also to the population. This condition, what could be called ‘war
weariness’, overrode the actions of spoilers. In particular, the Real IRA’s attempt
to upset the peace process through its 1998 Omagh bombing backfired; the attack
horrified the population and renewed sentiments for peace. The result of this
action was that the Real IRA was delegitimized in the eyes of the population and
isolated from their support, making them vulnerable for attack by the government
and mainstream IRA.
Second, the Irish case suggests that the status quo powers should not insist on
disarming insurgents before negotiations. In the IRA’s case, negotiations broke
down over disarmament but then resumed with the compromise of a strictly
adhered to ceasefire. The IRA disarmed gradually over several years and entered
the political process and held office while still armed. In this case, weapons
served as a defensive guarantee, not necessarily an opportunity for further
offensive action.
Third, the British needed to recognize the popular legitimacy of the
insurgent’s cause and their leaders. The popular call for Republican self-rule
persisted through generations of insurgents and revolts; attempting to eradicate
the insurgents did not end the cause. Moreover, peace talks could not succeed
without including popularly backed insurgent leaders. The 1991 peace talks in
Northern Ireland excluded Gerry Adams and Sinn Fe´in, which led to their
breakdown. It was only when the status quo officially invited Sinn Fe´in and the
IRA to the table that negotiations moved forward. Recognizing the legitimacy of
the insurgency’s leaders may also require the government to grant amnesties to
leaders and prisoners of war. In the Northern Irish case, the governments created
an amnesty program for the insurgents’ leaders and for members in prison. These
programs were controversial and not without dissenters, but they also appear to
have been a necessary step in moving negotiations forward.
In the Northern Irish case, the insurgents joined the government as part of the
peace plan. Prior to the peace plan, the insurgents already had political parties,
Sinn Fe´in in particular, that the government could include in the political process.
It is interesting to note that, once the insurgents became active in the political
process, they did not dominate the government; overall, the SDLP received a
greater percentage of the votes in Northern Ireland than Sinn Fe´in. In more recent
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elections, Sinn Fe´in won more seats than the SDLP, but this has not resulted in
radical changes in government policies.55 The Irish case suggests that
legitimizing insurgents and allowing them to participate in the political process
does not mean they will take over the process.
The Irish case also echoes Stedman’s argument that negotiations create
spoilers, and spoilers present challenges for making peace. Clearly spoilers were
present in the Irish case. However, as the British gave insurgents a greater role in
the political future of Northern Ireland, and as they compromised on
disarmament, spoilers became fewer, more extreme, and less in line with the
will of the population. By the time of the 1998 Omagh bombing, spoilers had lost
their ability to derail the process.
Finally, the Northern Irish case points out the challenges posed by diversity
within an insurgency attempting to change the political reality. The Northern
Irish case involved military occupation, and the bid to end Britain’s presence on
the island was a goal that united the Republicans. However, disagreements
existed within the Republicans over how to achieve this goal and how much to
compromise with the British, leading to the creation of several Republican
organizations. These internal dynamics complicated negotiations because the
insurgents were not operating as unified actors.
The disagreements within the Republican camp spilled over into elections
when insurgents entered the political process. The democratic process was able to
accommodate these conflicts, allowing leaders to compete for constituents non-
violently through campaigns that encompassed differing visions for a political
future. Allowing insurgents into the democratic process, therefore, has helped to
end the insurgency not because it has unified the actors but because it has allowed
for diversity to continue and to be negotiated through elections and the political
process. Northern Ireland’s ability to manage tensions within insurgent groups
speaks to the strength of its political and democratic institutions. Elections
became a means for managing spoilers and not the occasion for them to capture
the government through the political process.
God’s Party: the Lebanese Hezbollah
In his 1998 testimony before the US House of Representatives Committee on
National Security, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency R. James
Woolsey argued that the newly emerging terrorist threat to the United States
includes groups that are not interested in negotiating a peaceful settlement. He
testified: ‘Today there are unfortunately a number of terrorist groups, both
domestic and foreign, who – for ideological or religious reasons – are not
seeking a place at the table, but instead are seeking to blow up the table and kill
everyone sitting there.’56 Woolsey’s comment, echoing Stedman’s category of
‘total spoiler’, suggests that certain groups challenging the status quo are beyond
dialogue and have no desire to work within the system for political change. Is the
new generation of insurgents, especially Islamic insurgents, inherently
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antithetical to joining the political process, or do they bear similarities to the
previous generation of secular insurgencies like the IRA?
This section investigates the Lebanese Hezbollah, an insurgency group that
has aimed to end Israeli occupation and create an Islamic nation in Lebanon.57
Despite its seemingly intractable religious goals, Hezbollah has run in Lebanon’s
elections and held office. Hezbollah has also, at times, continued in an armed
struggle and has refused to disarm. Does this case suggest that the goals of
Islamic insurgents are ultimately incompatible with joining the political process,
or do other factors explain the breakdown in its transformation from an insurgent
movement to a political one?
Lebanon is perhaps the most religiously diverse country in the Middle East,
hosting Christians, Sunni and Shi’a Muslims, and a significant Druze population.
The country’s 1943 ‘National Pact’ reflects this diversity, enshrining a power-
sharing arrangement between the country’s 17 recognized religious groups,
including quotas in the parliament and cabinet appointments.58 The National Pact
awarded the country’s three main religious groups – Maronite Christians, Sunni
Muslims, and Shi’a Muslims – the presidency, premiership, and head of
parliament, respectively. This power-sharing arrangement reflected the estimated
numbers of each group, based on a 1932 census, and the influence of each religious
group at the time of independence; the Shi’a were the poorest and the least
politically mobilized and thus received a weak position in the government.59
Following a brief civil war in 1958, Lebanon settled into a tentative peace that
belied continued tensions between different groups in the country. Regional
tensions also affected the viability of the state. In particular, the 1967 ‘Six-Day
War’ produced an exodus of Palestinian refugees that settled in Lebanon,
followed by another wave of Palestinians expelled from Jordan in 1971, which
further complicated Lebanon’s demographic make-up.60 Tensions in Lebanon
erupted into a second civil war in 1975, after Christian Phalangist militants
opened fired on a bus in West Beirut, killing 27 of its Muslim passengers, most of
whom were Palestinian.61 The event sparked sectarian-based violence, which
plunged the country into protracted violence.
Lebanon’s neighboring countries quickly became involved in the civil war. In
1976, Syria sent forces into Lebanon which remained in the country until 2005.
The PLO also became active in Lebanon, taking advantage of the failed state to
set up a base from which to launch attacks on neighboring Israel.62 In March
1978, Israel invaded Lebanon with the aim of countering the growing PLO
presence in the country. The United Nations stepped in to negotiate the
withdrawal of Israeli forces and establish a peacekeeping force – the UN Interim
Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) – which remains in the country to the present.
In 1981, following the Israeli bombing of the PLO’s Beirut office, the United
States intervened with the hopes of resolving the conflict among Israel, Syria, the
PLO, and the Lebanese government, facilitating a ceasefire between the parties
later that year. That ceasefire ended when Israel reinvaded in 1982. Israeli
forces succeeded in briefly taking the capital, before they withdrew to the
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Shi’a-dominated south, where they created and maintained a ‘security zone’ until
2000. Israel also helped create the Southern Lebanese Army, a force composed
primarily of Lebanese Phalangist Christians, which it tasked with keeping the
peace in the security zone.63
It was within this milieu that the Lebanese Hezbollah emerged in 1982 as an
armed Islamic resistance force that promised to oust the United States and Israel
from Lebanon, liberate Palestine and Jerusalem from Israeli control, and establish
an Islamic republic in Lebanon.64 It is widely agreed that Hezbollah works with
and receives aid from Iran and possibly Syria. However, the exact nature of their
relationship and the degree of control that Iran and Syria have over Hezbollah is
debated.65 Prior to the creation of Hezbollah, other groups attempted to organize
the Shi’a population, including AMAL – a secular-based Shi’a movement
formed in the 1970s, later to become a non-violent political party – the Supreme
Islamic Shi’i Council in Lebanon, and several other non-sectarian parties.66
Hezbollah, however, would become the most important Shi’a movement in
Lebanon through its political, social, and military actions, and particularly
through its resistance to Israel.
Hezbollah began its insurgency against occupying forces by launching a
suicide attack on US and French barracks in Beirut on 23 October 1983, killing
297 troops and prompting the withdrawal of US forces from the country.67
Throughout the 1980s, Hezbollah continued a mixture of terrorist attacks against
foreign targets in Lebanon – including kidnapping and assassinating several US
citizens – bombings, and a plane hijacking.68 Hezbollah also engaged in guerilla
operations against Israeli forces in the security zone.
In addition to terrorist and guerilla operations, Hezbollah functioned as a de
facto government to the Shi’a populations concentrated in the south, the suburbs
of Beirut, and to the north in the Bekka Valley. Hezbollah developed medical
clinics, schools, welfare programs, and even a construction company to help
families rebuild homes destroyed by fighting.69 Hezbollah also established a
pension fund for families that lost members who fought within Hezbollah’s
ranks.70 To inform and influence the public, the organization created a satellite
channel, al Manar, a radio station, and a politburo.71 These services gave
Hezbollah a base of popular support, which, following the official end of the civil
war in 1990, would aid its efforts to become a political party.
In 1989, internationally backed negotiations began with the aim of ending
Lebanon’s 15-year civil war. The conflict officially ended in 1990 following the
signing of the Charter of Lebanese National Reconciliation (Ta’if Accords),
which reiterated political arrangements for Lebanon’s diverse religious
population and amended its constitution.72 The Ta’if Accords called for all
militias to disarm; Hezbollah, however refused to lay down its weapons. Israel
remained in Lebanon (as did Syria), and Hezbollah continued to engage in attacks
with the Israel Defense Forces. Israel also launched offensives aimed at defeating
Hezbollah, particularly the 1996 operation ‘Grapes of Wrath’, which resulted in
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the death of hundreds of refugees in the southern city of Qana and international
condemnation for the offensive.73
Following the official end of the civil war, Lebanon held parliamentary
elections in 1992. Hezbollah ran in elections, securing eight seats.74 In 2005
elections, Hezbollah won 14 out of 128 seats in parliament and secured two
ministries.75 Despite its initial goal of overthrowing the political system in
Lebanon, Hezbollah saw elections as a new means – coupled with continued
armed resistance – through which it could fight for change in the status quo. One
of their 1996 election slogans proclaimed: ‘[Fighters] resist with their blood.
Resist with your vote.’76
In 2000, Israel unilaterally withdrew from Lebanon, following the election of
Labor party candidate Ehud Barak to the premiership. Hezbollah heralded the
withdrawal as a victory. However, despite its departure from Lebanon, Israel
chose to maintain a hold over Shebaa Farms, a small piece of land that borders
Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. Israel has also refused to release the Hezbollah leader
Sheikh Abd-al-Karim Ubayd, whom they abducted in 1989, along with several
other prisoners of war.77
In 2004, the UN adopted resolution 1559, which calls for the ‘disbanding and
disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias’; Hezbollah has refused
to disarm, however, claiming that it was an ‘armed resistance movement’, not a
militia and citing its protracted battle with Israel over Shebaa Farms and the
release of its prisoners as grounds for remaining armed.78
On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah launched a raid across Israel’s border, abducting
two IDF soldiers and killing another eight. The provocative act prompted Israel to
launch an aggressive air campaign and ground invasion that lasted 33 days before
a UN-negotiated ceasefire.79 During the war, Hezbollah demonstrated that it had
a considerable arsenal of rockets including Iranian-made, medium-range Farj-5
and Farj-6 rockets along with long-range ZelZal rockets, which it launched
against the Israeli city of Haifa.80 It appears that Israel invaded initially to free the
captive soldiers, but then expanded its mission to include decimating Hezbollah’s
military capabilities and turning popular sentiment against Hezbollah.81 On the
last day before the ceasefire, however, Hezbollah launched more rockets than on
any previous day, demonstrating that its military capacity had not been destroyed.
It is also believed that Hezbollah is nowmore popular than ever for standing up to
Israel.82
More recently, Hezbollah has taken up arms against its own government,
using force after the Lebanese government tried to crack down on Hezbollah’s
internal telephone system and dismissed the pro-Hezbollah airport security chief
following a cost-of-living strike that began on 7 May 2008.83 Tensions calmed
after talks hosted by the Emir of Qatar, and the government backed down, but the
confrontation showed that neither the government nor Hezbollah has accepted a
military stalemate. The International Crisis Group argues that the confrontation
ultimately revolved around ‘an existential struggle over Hizbollah’s arms’.84 The
Crisis Group recommends de-escalating the conflict between Hezbollah and the
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government by agreeing to ‘a new president and national unity government that
accepts for now Hizbollah’s armed status while strictly constraining the ways in
which its weapons can be used’.85 In 2011, Hezbollah succeeded in garnering
enough votes in parliament to choose the country’s prime minister, placing Najib
Miqati in power and raising regional concerns over Hezbollah’s political
intentions.86
The persisting Hezbollah-led insurgency in Lebanon suggests that, despite
becoming part of the country’s legitimate political process and holding seats in
parliament, a resolution to the conflict has not occurred; this appears to be for
several reasons. Currently none of the sides in the Lebanese insurgency believes
in a military stalemate. The latest round of violence between Hezbollah and Israel
in July 2006 and current battles between Hezbollah and Lebanese forces suggest
that all sides believed they could profit from military confrontation. In the 2006
conflict with Israel, both sides declared a victory, despite the fact that Israel did
not get back its kidnapped soldiers and Hezbollah did not compel Israel to return
their prisoners of war or Shebaa Farms. Furthermore, the Shi’as have rallied
around Hezbollah and it is more militarized than before hostilities began. It even
appears that Hezbollah’s support has extended beyond the Shi’as to other
confessional groups, and the general Lebanese population has renewed hatred
toward Israel in the wake of the massive destruction it caused on the country’s
infrastructure.87 The May 2008 armed confrontations between Hezbollah and the
Lebanese government may actually suggest that there is not a military stalemate
and Hezbollah can change the status quo through force.88
Second, unlike the Northern Irish case, Hezbollah has run in elections and
held office independent of negotiations to end its fight with Israel. In this case,
elections have not been a connected strategy for ending insurgency with Israel or
for fully submitting to Lebanon’s laws. It is possible, although debatable with
recent developments, that Hezbollah has begun the transformation from an
illegitimate organization to a legitimate political player in the government,
running in elections and holding seats in parliament. This organization’s
willingness to participate in elections suggests that it wants a legitimate role in
Lebanon’s political life. However, armed exchanges between Hezbollah and the
Lebanese government also suggest that the insurgent group still sees violence as a
primary tool for changing the status quo and that the Lebanese government is not
strong enough, militarily and politically, to control Hezbollah and compel it to
adhere to the country’s rule of law.
Third, Israel and international actors have insisted on disarmament as a first
step in international recognition of Hezbollah’s legitimacy. One of Israel’s
principal goals in the July 2006 war was to disarm Hezbollah through military
action, suggesting that Israel also believes that Hezbollah can be defeated
militarily. After 33 days of fighting, however, Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal and
military capacity did not appear to have been significantly reduced. UNResolution
1701, which ended hostilities, calls for Hezbollah’s disarmament, the militia’s
subordination to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and disbandment of its
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troops.89 While Hezbollah will eventually have to do these things, the Irish case
suggests that insisting on disarming Hezbollah as a first step is unrealistic and
could be destabilizing. Moreover, Hezbollah has no incentives to lay down its
weapons; this is particularly true given Israel’s and Lebanon’s willingness to use
force as a primary reaction to provocation, not as a last resort, as the July war
demonstrated.
Fourth, Israel and most of the international community do not recognize the
political legitimacy of Hezbollah. This is a problem because Hezbollah is a
movement with a base of popular support, which is evident through its electoral
successes in Lebanon’s political process. Ignoring the popularity of Hezbollah
will not result in its disappearance from the political scene. If anything, it may
actually fuel its popularity as a group that resists and defies international
pressures.
Unlike the Irish case, the transformation of Hezbollah into a political party
presents the unique problem of whether or not religious political parties can
participate in a democracy. The conventional wisdom is that allowing Islamic
groups, insurgents or otherwise, to form political parties will undoubtedly lead to
disaster along the lines of the Iranian Revolution or the cancelled 1991 Algerian
elections that plunged the country into civil war.90 However, other examples
suggest that allowing religious political parties to participate in elections can
occur without causing the system to collapse. For example, Jordan has allowed
Islamic parties to run for seats in its House of Representatives, beginning in
1992.91 The elections resulted in a strong victory for Islamic political parties and
the Muslim Brotherhood, which together won 34 of the 80 seats.92 When these
parties failed to deliver on their promises, they suffered at the following elections
in 1993 and won only 16 seats.93 Likewise, Israel has allowed religious parties to
participate in its elections, beginning in 1956, and currently includes several
parties, the strongest being Shas, which has held seats in the Knesset, the Israeli
parliament, and cabinet positions.
Religious political parties, therefore, have participated in the political process
without causing the collapse of the system. Hezbollah has shown that it can
compromise on its religious goals; it no longer claims to be establishing an
Islamic republic in Lebanon.94 Rather, Hezbollah has been problematic because
of its continued use of force as a means of trying to change the political
landscape, despite actually being part of the government. This problem is not
unique to Hezbollah’s religiosity. It is a problem that plagues insurgencies that
have not universally agreed to a military stalemate.
Conclusions and implications for Afghanistan
The insurgencies in Ireland and Lebanon suggest the following four conditions
under which bringing insurgents into the political process can help end political
violence. The first, and most important, necessary condition is that the
government, insurgents, and the population all have to agree that the conflict
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cannot be resolved militarily, which opens the door for alternative, political
means for conflict resolution. If the insurgents, the government, or the population
do not fully believe in a military stalemate, then it is unlikely that bringing
insurgents into the political process alone will help end the insurgency. The
Lebanon case clearly demonstrates the importance of all sides needing to believe
that the conflict cannot be won through military means alone; without this
necessary condition, one or more sides will be tempted to use force as a means of
changing the status quo.
Second, in order to keep the military stalemate, the status quo powers should
not insist on disarmament as a precondition for insurgents entering the political
process. Under these conditions, weapons serve as a defensive guarantee, not
necessarily an opportunity for offensive action. Rather than calling for insurgents
to lay down their arms, both sides should agree to a ceasefire and clear conditions
for participating in the government. As the IRA case has shown, full disarmament
needs to come at the end of the negotiation process, not the beginning.
Third, the government and occupying forces need to recognize the popular
legitimacy of the insurgency’s cause and its leaders; if the cause has a base of
support, eradicating the insurgents will not end the insurgency. Allowing
insurgents into the political process can be an important tool for accommodating
the insurgency’s cause, holding them accountable to their constituents, and
bringing them under the legal strictures of the state. Furthermore, insurgents
rarely exist as unified actors and the government needs to recognize this diversity
and to include the key players. Bringing different insurgent groups into the
political process – especially through political parties – can help manage these
internal disagreements by allowing leaders to compete for constituents non-
violently through campaigning. In other words, allowing insurgents into the
democratic process can help to end insurgencies not because it unifies the actors
but because it allows for diversity to continue and to be negotiated through
elections.
Fourth, the government’s institutions will need to be strong enough to
manage the inclusion of insurgents in the political process. A culture of political
debate and compromise is important for accommodating changes in the political
agenda, which will undoubtedly be introduced by insurgents; for states that are
emerging from a dictatorship or that do not have a culture of democracy, these
practices will most likely not be present. Moreover, allowing insurgents into the
political process requires rules and consequences for not adhering to the laws of
the land. The country, therefore, will need rule of law and the ability to enforce it.
Finally, the government will most likely have to grant amnesties to insurgents
and some of the leaders of the insurgency as one means of legitimizing their right
to participate in the political process. These programs are controversial and often
politically unpalatable because they do not bring the insurgents to justice for
violent acts. Moreover, it is important that the population accepts an amnesty
program and will not try to seek justice extra-judicially. Not all insurgents should
get amnesty, however. For example, those that abused human rights should be
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held accountable for their crimes. But an amnesty program will most likely be
necessary to allow insurgents to lay down their weapons and legitimately join the
political process.
Overall, if the insurgency has a base of support and cannot be defeated
militarily, the government will have tomakemore concessions than the insurgents
to create the conditions for lasting peace. Politically and emotionally, this is a
significant demand to place on a country’s leaders.
What do these finding suggest for the insurgency in Afghanistan?
The current military conditions in Afghanistan suggest that there are several
challenges for bringing insurgents into the political process. First, it appears that
the insurgents, the government, occupying forces, and the populations in
Afghanistan still believe that the conflict can be resolved through militarily
means. In Afghanistan, the resurgence of the Taliban suggests that they have
regrouped and are attempting to change the status quo through force. The initial
reaction from the government and occupying forces to the Taliban’s challenge
has been military confrontation. However, beginning in 2010, NATO-led
International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and the Afghan government
have initiated a more holistic strategy for ending the insurgency in Afghanistan,
including talks with the Taliban. Despite this, it is unclear whether or not all sides
believe in a military stalemate, or even if that is the case.
In addition to all sides still using force in attempts to end the conflict,
Afghanistan has the added problem of being a fledgling democracy. Unlike
Northern Ireland and Lebanon, Afghanistan does not have a history of democratic
practices or civil institutions that are essential for a democracy to manage these
challenges to the new political status quo successfully. Although both the
Northern Irish and Lebanese governments have gone through periods of limited
or suspended democracy in their histories, their politicians and populations have
a basic understanding of the system’s rules – learned through multiple iterations
of elections and rotation of leadership – and the importance of negotiation and
compromise required in order for democracies to succeed. Afghanistan does not
have this institutional development or practical experience that comes from
decades of elections and the norms of shared power, which undoubtedly adds to
their problems of dealing with insurgents politically.
Second – and following on the first point – disarming the insurgents is
currently not an option in Afghanistan. The Taliban are not going to lay down
their weapons voluntarily because they think they are winning the conflict
militarily. Moreover, disarming the insurgents by force does not appear to be
working. As the IRA and Hezbollah cases show, focusing on disarmament will
likely backfire, giving insurgents a legitimate reason to stay armed as a means of
defense against the threat posed by their government’s militaries or occupying
forces. Rather than pushing for disarmament, status quo powers would do better
to begin the dialogue process with the groups armed and move towards a political
solution that renders force unnecessary.
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Third, in Afghanistan, it appears that some of the insurgents – but not all –
have a popular base of support. The conflict in Afghanistan has three main
groups: the Taliban (which is not a unified actor), al-Qaeda, and drug lords
connected with Afghanistan’s poppy production. Not all of these groups have a
popular base of support, but it is possible that some do. It is doubtful, for
example, that large numbers of the Afghan population back al-Qaeda.
Afghanistan’s drug lords, however, may have some popular backing. The drug
trade has seen a recent upsurge, with production reaching an all time high in
2007, suggesting that poppy farmers in the south are continuing to make a living
through this form of agriculture and that drug lords are aiding in that process,
perhaps giving them legitimacy with the local population.95 Some elements of the
Taliban may also have popular backing. There is evidence to suggest that some
post-US invasion Taliban leaders have actually created political campaigns and
are reaching out to the population, hinting that they understand the importance of
popular support for maintaining the fight against the government.96 Negotiations
with the Taliban may be useful, but that depends on the extent of their popular
support, and their willingness to work through the political system, not fight to
overthrow it.
As an important precondition to bringing insurgents into the political process,
the government in Afghanistan will most likely need amnesty programs in order
to transition individuals involved in the insurgency into mainstream society and
political life. These programs are controversial and often politically unpalatable
because they do not bring the insurgents to justice for violent acts. In
Afghanistan, the government initiated an amnesty program beginning in 2002 –
Program-e Tahkim-e Sohl – aimed at encouraging Taliban members to defect
from the organization and re-enter normal society. A reported 1,100 people took
advantage of the program before it collapsed, including a man who later became
the governor of Oruzgan Province.97 More recently, the Afghan government, in
coordination with ISAF, has created a program that aims to flip low-level
members of the Taliban by offering jobs and an opportunity to contribute to the
betterment of their local communities.98 Amnesty, despite its unpopularity, is an
important condition for ending hostilities.
Finally, it is important to consider that there may be ‘total spoilers’,
insurgents who have no desire to work through the political system and whose
primary objective is in fact to ‘blow the table up’. However, it is important to
consider several possibilities about such groups. First, not all groups fit into this
category; there are groups that want a place at the table. Second, as Stedman
acknowledges, groups change over time and in response to domestic and
international circumstances; therefore, a group’s posture at one point in time may
not be their stance at another. Third, not all members may agree on the group’s
stated policy vis-a`-vis the means for achieving its political goals. Each of these
caveats presents opportunities for counterinsurgency strategies including
negotiations and bringing insurgents into the political process.
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